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Abstract
When considering the legal implications of monitoring and surveillance in the
workplace, the question may be asked why companies deploy computer
surveillance and monitoring in the first place. Several reasons may be put
forward to justify why more than 80% of all major American firms monitor
employee e-mails and Internet usage. However, what most companies forget is
the fact that the absence or presence of monitoring and surveillance activities in
a company holds serious legal consequences for companies. From the
discussion in this paper it will become apparent that there is a vast difference in
how most countries approach this subject matter. On the one hand America
does not afford any employee a reasonable expectation of privacy when it
comes to the use of corporate computer resources and systems, while in
contrast to this position the United Kingdom goes out of its way to protect each
employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This paper will not only
investigate the different approaches followed by some of the world-leader, but
will also investigate the legal consequences embedded in each approach. This
paper will ultimately enable the reader to judge for himself/herself which
approach his/her country should follow while being fully informed of the legal
consequences attached to the chosen approach.
Keywords: information security, legal issues, monitoring and surveillance,
privacy
1. INTRODUCTION
There are various legal issues that are embedded in workplace monitoring and
surveillance. Mainly, there are two main schools of thought that exist on this
subject-matter. On the one hand there are those that argue that employers are
the owners of the computing equipment, resources and systems and they
therefore have a right to monitor how their property is being used, and then
there are those that argue that employees’ rights to privacy should weigh more
than that of any employer.
When examining the relevant statutes, case law and regulations it becomes
apparent that in most jurisdictions a notice requirement exist, but this notice of
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surveillance and/or monitoring is rarely sufficient. This paper will examine
Internet and e-mail related surveillance and monitoring in the workplace from a
comparative legal perspective. Ultimately, the aim of this paper is to inform
readers of the current legal position existing in some of the most important
jurisdictions world-wide, thereby enabling readers to make up their own minds
on which approach their country should follow, and enabling readers to
understand the legal consequences embedded in each approach.
2. JUSTIFICATION FOR MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE IN
THE WORKPLACE
“Surveillance technology is neither inherently bad nor good, but …there is
both good and bad surveillance.”
When considering the legal implications of monitoring and surveillance in the
workplace, the question may be asked why companies deploy computer
surveillance and monitoring in the first place. Several reasons may be put
forward to justify why more than 80% of all major American firms monitor
employee e-mails and Internet usage. The first reason centers around employee
productivity. As a result of the Internet and e-mails employee productivity has
decreased. This is a major concern for employers, as Internet use surveys
continue to indicate that the majority of employees spend anywhere from 10
minutes to an hour every day surfing sites unrelated to doing their jobs – using
their work computers to read virtual newspapers, or go online shopping, or
even viewing naked woman. Secondly, network performance must be
considered. Employees that download video or audio files from the Internet are
taking up a great amount of bandwidth. It therefore makes sense that employers
spend money on Internet monitoring tools rather than on increasing the
bandwidth. Thirdly, the very real risk exists that a company may be held
legally liable for the online activities performed by its employees. For example
the brokerage firm of Morgan Stanley was exposed to $70 million lawsuit
because of racist jokes that appeared on the company’s e-mail system. Also,
Dow Chemicals discovered through computer surveillance technologies that 50
employees were using the company’s computers to store and send sexual or
violent images, resulting in the termination of all of these employees. Fourthly,
all companies are faced with the ever present ‘insider threat’. It is therefore
understandable that companies will go to great lengths to protect the
confidentiality of its corporate information and trade secrets even if it is from
its own employees.
3. MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE – THE CANADIAN
PERSPECTIVE
3.1 Introduction
It is generally accepted that in terms of Canadian law employees enjoy very
little to no privacy protection in the workplace when it comes to computer and
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email surveillance. MacIsaac observes: “…many employers consider electronic
mail sent and received using company computer equipment and stored on
company computer networks to be the property of the employer. From the
employer’s perspective this is a business resource paid for by the employer and
is to be used only for business purposes. Therefore, e-mail messages and
telephone conversations made on behalf of the employee in the course of
business should be made available for review for legitimate business and
security reasons. For these reasons, an employee acting on behalf of their
employer should have no reasonable expectation of privacy”.
This view was supported in an arbitration case in which a college lab
technician’s employment was terminated after sending unwarranted allegation
against other employees to the campus-wide email message board. The case
finding reiterated the principle of ‘office e-mail: no reasonable expectation of
privacy’.
Today however, a definite move towards finding a balance between monitoring
and privacy may be observed in Canadian law. As stated in the previous
chapter, the most important source of privacy protection in Canada is found in
the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA)
2000. PIPEDA recognizes the importance of finding a balance between an
employer’s need to collect certain personal data, and an employee’s need for
privacy protection. The Act states: “…the purpose of this part [Protection of
Personal Information in the Private Sector] is to establish, in an era in which
technology increasingly facilitates the circulation and exchange of information,
rules to govern the collection, use and disclosure of personal information in a
manner that recognizes the rights to privacy of individuals with respect to their
personal information and the need of organizations to collect, use or disclose
personal information for purposes that a reasonable person would consider
appropriate in the circumstances”.
3.2 Regulatory framework – PIPEDA
When evaluating employee surveillance within the ambit of PIPEDA the
following observations should be made:
(i)

Firstly, the provision in PIPEDA of ‘appropriate purpose’ limits
the use, collection and disclosure of personal information to
situations which a reasonable person would deem to be appropriate
under the circumstances. Within the ambit of the workplace this
would imply that mere consent by an employee to surveillance is
no longer sufficient as the provision clearly states that a reasonable
person must consider the circumstances to be appropriate.
Therefore it may be argued that where surveillance takes place
under the façade of creating and maintaining a harassment free and
safe working environment, it is likely that the courts will declare
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such surveillance to be unlawful because of the absence of a
known issue in response to which surveillance takes place;
(ii)

Secondly, PIPEDA requires of companies must appoint a privacy
officer who will be responsible for ensuring that the company
complies with its privacy obligations. The act suggests that the
collection of personal workplace data no longer falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the company’s technology personnel, but
the privacy officer must also be involved;

(iii)

Thirdly, the act contains specific provision relating to the
notification of employees of workplace surveillance. It is expected
of companies to: (a) identify the purpose for which the data is
being collected; (b) obtain consent prior to collection; and (c) to
limit collection of personal data to that which is necessary for the
purposes as set out by the company. The aim of these provisions
are to: (a) limit the type of information a company may collect;
and (b) demand of companies to inform their employees of the
surveillance policies of the company. The act does however
contain an exception to the general rule that notice must be given
to employees before surveillance may take place. Section 7(1) (b)
of the act states:
“…an organization may collect personal
information without the knowledge or consent of the individual
only if …it is reasonable to expect that the collection with the
knowledge or consent of the individual would compromise the
availability or the accuracy of the information and the collection is
reasonable for purposes related to investigating a breach of an
agreement or a contravention of laws of Canada or a province”.

(iv)

Fourthly, the Act requires that “personal information shall be
retained only as long as is necessary for the fulfillment of the
[identified] purpose”. Therefore, this provision regulates an
employers’ use of information after collection thereof. Employers
are furthermore prohibited from keeping personal information for
an unlimited time period.

3.3 Employee monitoring and surveillance – The present position in
Canada
The Canadian court’s commitment to privacy protection has come to the fore
in recent years. In 1999 the B.C. Supreme Court ruled in the Weir case that email does enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy. Also in that same year the
case of Pacific Northwest Herb Corp v Thompson 1999 BCJ No 2772 came
before the court. Thompson was an employee of Pacific Northwest who used
the company’s computer in his home for business and personal purposes. After
termination of his employment he continued using the company computer for
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personal purposes. Amongst the documents on the computer was a file
containing documents relating to the wrongful dismissal action he was
planning to institute against Pacific Northwest. Before returning the computer
to the company he hired a computer consultant to erase all the data on the hard
drive. His attempts were however unsuccessful, and after returning the
computer to Pacific Northwest the company was able to restore the data.
Thompson sought an interdict to prevent Pacific Northwest to exploit the data,
claiming that his right to privacy and solicitor-client privilege has been
infringed. The judge in this case concluded that Thompson had a reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding documents that were created for personal use.
In R v Duarte 1990 1 SCR 945 the judge concluded that although the right to
privacy was not absolute, it must be “judged against what is reasonable in the
circumstances and, amongst other things, is dependant upon competing
interests such as the relationship between the parties”. The court went even
further and stated that in order to determine what would amount to ‘reasonable
in the circumstances’, three considerations must be kept in mind: (i) whether it
was reasonable to request surveillance; (ii) whether the surveillance was
conducted in a reasonable manner; and (iii) whether any other alternatives to
surveillance were available to the employer.
This case has been approved in many other cases. In St Mary’s Hospital and
HEU 64 LAC (4th) 382 an electrician discovered a video camera in the ceiling
of a manager’s office. The local union was outraged at this surreptitious
surveillance, and filed a grievance. The arbitrator found in this case that
surveillance can be characterized in three ways: (a) benign surveillance which
would entail surveillance done for the benefit of the employee; (b) security
surveillance which has as its main aim to ensure the protection of employees as
well as the employer; and (c) surreptitious surveillance which represents the
most intrusive force of surveillance. The arbitrator was of the opinion that this
form of surveillance requires strict justification. Furthermore, in Re Toronto
Transit Commission and ATU Loc 113 (Belsito) 95 LAC (4th) 402 and in New
Flyer Industries Ltd and CAW Canada Loc 3003 (Mogg) 85 LAC (4th) 304 the
court acknowledged that “surveillance by an employer may, in certain
circumstances, infringe upon an employee’s right to privacy to an unreasonable
extent”.
The Privacy Commissioner has made his views on workplace surveillance, the
privacy of e-mails and the reasonable expectation of privacy clear. The
Commissioner states: “I don’t accept that the protection necessarily translates
into wholesale surveillance of e-mails or computer use. We accept that there
are stringent limits on an employer’s rights to read employees’ mail, eavesdrop
on their telephone calls or rifle through their desk drawers. I think we have to
look closely at e-mail communications to see what principles should apply
there as well”.

27

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 2(2)
The Commissioner went on to comment on the practice of some companies to
state in their email policies that the employees should have no reasonable
expectation of privacy when using the e-mail systems: “[t]he law of privacy
has developed around the notion of the ‘reasonable expectation’; one of the
ways that the courts determine whether privacy has been violated has been to
determine first whether a person could have reasonable expected privacy in a
particular place and time. But I don’t agree that it follows that an employee’s
or anyone’s privacy can be simply eradicated by telling them not to expect any.
While management has the right and the responsibility to manage, it has to
operate within limits, including respect for fundamental rights. It is not for
management alone to determine whether an expectation of privacy is
reasonable”.
Therefore, a clear shift in the pendulum in Canadian law may be observed. In
the past emphasis was placed on whether or not the employee had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, today emphasis is placed on the question whether or not
the surveillance is reasonable. It is now accepted that workplace surveillance,
whether it be by video camera, server-side computer monitoring, or client-side
computer monitoring, cannot be justified by simply giving notice to an
employee. An investigation will have to be launched into the reasonableness of
the surveillance.
Geist identifies six factors which may be taken into consideration when
wanting to determine whether or not the computer or email surveillance is
reasonable in terms of Canadian law:
(i)

The target of the surveillance – Consideration must be given to
whether computer surveillance will be conducted across the
company as a whole or if it will be targeted against specific
employees;

(ii)

Purpose of the surveillance – Companies that install new
surveillance technologies must be able to show how these
technologies support their objectives;

(iii)

Alternatives to surveillance – It is suggested that other surveillance
technologies that are much less intrusive on an employee’s right to
privacy in the workplace must first be investigated;

(iv)

The surveillance technology – The choice of surveillance
technology must be reasonable taking into account the purpose of
the surveillance;

(v)

Adequacy of notice – in terms of the Criminal Code as well as
PIPEDA consent must be obtained from the employee. This would
entail not merely informing employees of the fact of surveillance
but also giving them an accurate description of the company’s
surveillance practices; and
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(vi)

The implementation of the surveillance activities – the company
will have to ensure that unauthorized persons are not able to gain
access to the surveillance information.
3.4 Conclusion

From the above it may be concluded that in Canadian law neither the right to
privacy nor the right to surveillance is absolute. Canadian law attempts to find
a balance between the interest of the employer and the rights of the employee
by focusing on the reasonableness of the surveillance.
4. MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE IN THE WORKPLACE –
THE AMERICAN POSITION
4.1 Introduction
At present the position in America is that no employee has any constitutional,
federal or common law legal remedies for redress where an employer abuses
email and Internet monitoring and surveillance.
4.2 Constitutional protection against employee monitoring and
surveillance


Federal constitution

The US Constitution does not afford anyone the right to privacy expressly. The
constitution only recognizes privacy as a penumbral theory. This explains why
the right to privacy has not been extended to protect an employee’s electronic
communications. Cherminisky observes: “[m]ost Americans would be
surprised to learn that there is no right to privacy granted in the United States
Constitution. The Fourth Amendment protects privacy in limiting police
searches and arrests, but privacy in terms of autonomy and the right to be left
alone by the government is not mentioned in the text of the Constitution”.
Consequently, the present position in the United States is that employees, in a
private workplace, are not afforded any protection against electronic
surveillance because of the doctrine of state surveillance. In contrast to this
public sector employees have a certain degree of constitutional protection
against abusive monitoring in the workplace. Included in this would be the
right to reasonable searches and seizures. American courts have even gone so
far as to state that public sector employees have a reasonable expectation of
privacy regarding their emails and Internet communications.
 State constitution
Privacy protection in respect of state constitutions vary to a great extend. It is
however important to bear in mind that to date no court has extended state
constitutional protection of privacy to email monitoring and surveillance in the
workplace. Most states do not require employers to give employees any form
of notification when monitoring their emails and Internet communications.
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4.3 Federal legislation – The ECPA


Title I of the ECPA – The Federal Wiretap Statute

In terms Title I (The federal Wiretap Act) of the ECPA interception of
electronic communications such as telephone calls and emails are prohibited.
The Act prohibits the following activities:
(i)

intercepting
or
communications;

endeavoring

to

intercept

electronic

(ii)

disclosing or endeavoring to disclose intercepted electronic
communications; and

(iii)

using the content of intercepted information.

It therefore follows that if an employer intercepts email or monitors Internet
communications of his/her employee, his actions will fall within the ambit of
the ECPA. The following important observations must be, made in this regard.
First, it is required that the interception and/or monitoring should be made
intentional. Secondly, the content of the communication is only protected as
long as it is under transmission. Consequently, Title I will not be applicable
where an employer searches an employee’s stored emails.
Two exceptions are contained in Title I. First, the ECPA allows service
provides to intercept and disclose electronic communication if either the sender
or the receiver consented thereto, or the ‘ordinary course of business’ exception
can be applied. The latter exception however, proves to be highly problematic.
In order for an employer to make use of the ‘ordinary course of business
exception’ it is expected of the employer to proof the following:
(i)

the device used to intercept the electronic communication is “a
telephone or telegraphic instrument, equipment or facility, or
a…component thereof,” provided or installed by the employer
himself/herself; and

(ii)

that the specific device is employed by the employer in his/her
ordinary course of business.

It must furthermore be borne in mind that an employer is only authorized to
intercept the communication for long enough to determine the nature of the
conversation. Once the employer has determined that the communication is
personal in nature he/she must immediately terminate interception.


Title II of the ECPA – The Stored Communications Act of 2005

Title II of the ECPA (The Stored Communications Act of 2005) provides
guidance when wanting to obtain access or disclosure of electronic
communication, such as messages left on a voice machine, once in storage. A
violation of Title II will result in civil liability for any person who (a)
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intentionally accesses, without authorization, a facility through which an
electronic communication service is provided; or (b) intentionally exceeds an
authorization access and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access
to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage.
As soon as an electronic message has been stored the SCA will regulate the
situation. This is irrespective of the length of storage.
When considering the operation of Title II it becomes evident that emails are
generally considered to be stored communications in terms of American law.
Consequently, employers are authorized to access electronic communications
under this title. However, this means that Title I of the ECPA is in actual fact
rendered useless.
From the above discussion it may be concluded that in virtually all cases
decided by American courts in the last decade it has been decided that
employees do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. In some instance
American courts have gone so far as to validate employee monitoring even
where advance warning was not given to the employee. The following
American case law supports this statement:


Employee monitoring and surveillance without notice

In Restuccia v Burk Technology 1996 Mass Super LEXIS 367 (Super Ct
(Mass) Aug 13 1996) the employer neglected to have an email policy stating
the possibility that emails can be monitored, stored on back-up or that emails
may not be used for personal messages. When viewing back-up files the
employer discovered email messages containing nick-names for the president
of the company and references to an extra-marital affair with another
employee. The president of the company terminated the two employee’s
employment based on the fact that they were using the email system too much.
The ex-employees argued that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy
because of the fact that they had personal passwords to access their message
system. the court found that the president’s action of reading the email
messages on the back-up system constituted an infringement of the privacy of
the ex employees. In this case the ex-employees were successful in their claim,
but in every other workplace interception case the defendant’s were awarded
summary judgment in a claim that workplace surveillance invaded a plaintiff’s
right of privacy.
Furthermore, in Smyth v Pillsbury Co 914 F Supp 97 (ED Pa 1996) an
employee was fired after having made negative comments about a sales
manager in an email. The email contained treats to “kill the backstabbing
bastards”. The company had, on various occasions, assured its employees that
all emails are confidential and privileged. The company based the termination
of employment on “transmitting what it deemed to be inappropriate and
unprofessional comments over the company’s e-mail system”. The employee
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however argued wrongful termination. The federal court decided that the
termination of the employee was justified, as the employee had no expectation
of privacy in the employer’s email system. The court went even further to state
that even if the employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy it would not
amount to invasion of privacy if an employer intercepted messages on a system
it owned.
Moreover, in McLaren v Microsoft Corp Microsoft 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS
4103, 1999 WL 339015 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) accessed personal folders on a
network in order to investigate claims of sexual harassment. The employee
claimed that Microsoft had violated his reasonable expectation of privacy. The
emails that Microsoft eventually uncovered did provide evidence that the
employee was engaging in a “systematic pattern of sexual harassment”. The
court held that it was not going to recognise a cause of action for invasion of
privacy, even though the employee had a special password and the files were
marked ‘personal’. The court stated in this case that the decisive factor was that
the computer was the property of the employer and formed part of the
computer environment. The court furthermore stated that because of the fact
that the folder was transmitted over the network, it was inevitable that it would
be accessed by a third party at some stage. Consequently, the plaintiff had no
expectation of privacy with regards to the files marked ‘private’.


Employee monitoring and surveillance with notice

By implementing an email and Internet policy companies safeguard themselves
against any privacy-based claims by employees. In Bourke v Nissan Motor
Corp Nissan California Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District, Case No.
B068705 (July 1996) made every employee sign a waiver form in which they
had to acknowledge that they understood that Nissan’s email system was to be
used for business purposes exclusively. In this case the court decided that this
waiver was fatal to any claim an employee can bring based on invasion of
privacy.
Furthermore, in Garrity v John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company 2002
US Dist. LEXIS 8343 (D Mass. May 7, 2000) two long term employees
forwarded sexually explicit jokes to third parties. One of their co-workers
complaint after receiving such an email. The company had an email policy
providing that “messages that are defamatory, abusive, obscene, profane,
sexually orientated, threatening or racially offensive” are prohibited. The two
woman’s employment was consequently terminated. The court dismissed the
privacy based action brought by the two women stating that employees do not
have any reasonable expectation of privacy pertaining to work related emails.
The court furthermore made a very harsh statement by stating that the fact that
the company had an email policy was irrelevant. The court concluded that the
employer’s right and duty to limit harassment in the workplace outweighs any
rights the plaintiffs’ though they had in respect of privacy.
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Moreover, in Thygeson v US Bancorp 2004 US Dist. LEXIS 18863 (D. Ore.
Sept 15, 2004) the bank’s employment handbook stated that employees were
prohibited to “use US Bancorp computer resources for personal business”. The
handbook furthermore stated “do not access inappropriate internet sites and do
not send emails which may be perceived as offensive, intimidating, or hostile
or that are in violation of Company policy”. One of Bancorp’s employees were
spending more than four hours a day visiting non work related Internet sites on
his work computer. The company furthermore discovered that he was viewing
“inappropriate emails containing pictures of nudity and sexually offensive
jokes”. The employee was subsequently fired. The employee brought an action
against the bank arguing that they invaded his privacy as well as the federal
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by firing him without
awarding him severance pay. The court found that the employee had no
expectation of privacy when his employer accessed the files on its network that
the plaintiff saved using a personal password, then this employee had no
expectation of privacy in his email ‘merely labeled personal’ without even
creating a password.
4.4 Conclusion
The conclusion must be reached that when it comes the subject matter of
workplace monitoring and surveillance, all indication are that it is proemployer. Employees have no real remedies for the abuse of email and Internet
monitoring and surveillance. Furthermore almost all courts in America have
held that employees do not have a right to privacy in the workplace. Courts
continue to justify their position by stating that since business computers are
the property of its employers, employers have an unfettered right to monitor its
usage. American employees will furthermore be unable to find any relief in the
US constitution, common law of torts or the ECPA.
5. MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE IN THE WORKPLACE –
THE UNITED KINGDOM’S PERSPECTIVE
5.1 Introduction
The United Kingdom is a member of the European Union. Consequently, the
United Kingdom has to comply with EU directives on the subject matter of
employee monitoring and surveillance. In terms of the European Community
Treaty it is expected of the UK to propagate enabling legislation which will
give effect to the fundamental rights as set forth in the Council of Europe
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of
1950 (ECHR) and legislation of the EU.
5.2 Regulatory framework
Because of the operation of the doctrine of vicarious liability, the UK
government has accepted that employers do have the right to monitor their
employees. However, in contrast to the approach followed in America, the
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right of an employer to monitor is balanced with the employee’s right to
privacy.
The legal framework for Internet monitoring in the United Kingdom comprises
of five main statutes and almost no case law on the subject matter.


The Data Protection Act of 1998

All British employers must comply with the United Kingdom’s implementation
of the European Union Directive on Data Protection in the form of the Data
Protection Act of 1998. In terms of the DPA data controllers are compelled not
only to inform the employee of the monitoring system, but also to protect the
data processed in accordance with the Data Protection Principles (DPA).
In terms of the DPA electronic monitoring has to comply with the following
requirements:
(i)

the monitoring must be lawful and fair;

(ii)

the monitoring program must be necessary; and

(iii)

the monitoring program must be proportionate to achieving the
legitimate business objective while simultaneously protecting the
right to privacy of the individual employee.

In terms of the DPA only one exception exists regarding the notification
requirement: if electronic monitoring is done with the aim of preventing a
specific crime the employer will not have to adhere to the notice requirement.


The Human Rights Act of 1998

The DPA furthermore takes cognizance of the Human Rights Act of 1998. In
terms of this Act the privacy of any private communication, telephone
conversation and email communication is expressly protected. It is important to
observe that the Human Rights Act draws a distinction between public and
private sector employers. If the employer falls within the ambit of the public
sector, the employee will have a direct cause of action in terms of the Human
Rights Act.
Employees in the United Kingdom enjoy further protection in terms of article 8
of the ECHR. In terms of article 8 of the Act “everyone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home, and his correspondence”. This
convention affords private employees with a legal remedy to challenge abusive
monitoring practices. The European Court of Human Rights has extended the
definition of ‘private life and correspondence’ to include business relations,
emails and other electronic communications.
Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s chief regulatory agency (OFTEL) issued
in 1999 Guidance on recording on private conversations. The aim of these
guidelines was to provide employers with guidelines when wanting to
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implement electronic monitoring without violating their employees’ right to
privacy.


The Regulation of Investigative Powers Act of 2000

In terms of this Act it is a criminal offence to intercept data without
authorization. It is however important to keep in mind that RIP is not
applicable to private telecommunications systems such as intranets and Virtual
Private Networks. Moreover, no provision in RIP addresses electronic
monitoring in the workplace expressly. In general employers are permitted to
intercept emails and to monitor Internet access as long as both the sender and
receiver agree thereto. Employers may furthermore only intercept emails and
Internet communications if the monitoring is conducted in order to carry out
the employer’s business activities.


The Lawful Business Practice Regulations (LBPR)

This Act governs the rights and responsibilities of businesses relating to
monitoring electronic communications. This Act provides certain exceptions to
the RIP Act. The most important of which is that monitoring without
compliance with the notice requirement can take place. In terms of this
exception companies may monitor and keep record of Internet communications
in order to comply and adhere to regulatory or self-regulatory practices and
procedures. There is however a limitation placed on monitoring activities by
providing that such activities may only take place if a company employee uses
the computer system within the scope of his/her duties. Furthermore, in terms
of the LBPR interception without consent is authorized if the interception has
one or more of the following purposes:
(i)

to establish the existence of facts, to ascertain compliance with the
regulatory or self-regulatory practices or procedures (quality
control and training);

(ii)

to prevent or detect crimes;

(iii)

to investigate or detect unauthorized use of telecommunication
systems;

(iv)

to secure; and

(v)

to determine whether or not the communications are business
communications.

It should furthermore be kept in mind that interception will only be authorised if
the controller of the telecommunication system (employer) made reasonable
efforts to inform potential users that interception may take place. Also the scope
of application of this Act is limited to business communication therefore the
interception of personal communications will not be legal in terms of this act.
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5.3 Conclusion
In terms of the RIP Act, LBPR and the DPA it would appear that an employer
will only be authorized to lawful intercept communications if it is done ‘in the
course of transmission’. The legislature therefore encourages UK companies to
have a clearly Internet and email usage policy in place. If an employee wants to
base his/her claim on infringement of privacy, the Code of Practice will be the
most effective regulation for him/her to rely on.
6. CONLUSION
It is evident from the preceding discussion that Canada, the United States and
the United Kingdom have very different views on the protection that should be
afforded to employees when dealing with monitoring and surveillance in the
workplace.
In America a pro-employer regime is applied in terms of which employees
have lost all their privacy based actions. Consequently, employees in America
have no reasonable expectation of privacy. It would appear as if American
employers have an absolute immunity against the constitution, common law
and federal statutory remedies for abusive surveillance practices. In terms of
American law it is evident that everything including electronic
communications on a work computer belongs to the employer. Furthermore,
business and private communications are deemed to be the property of the
employer. Therefore, employers are permitted to monitor any electronic
communication even if the employer has no e-mail and/or Internet usage policy
in place which could serve to notify employees of the fact that their electronic
communications are being monitored.
In stark contrast to the American position, in the UK the monitoring and
surveillance of employees are strictly proscribed. In the EU and consequently
in the UK, electronic monitoring must be reasonably based, proportional,
transparent and non-discriminatory. The European Court of Justice feels that it
is very important for companies to have written e-mail and Internet usage
policies stating what the company’s position is regarding employee
surveillance and monitoring. This is in contrast with the position in America
where courts have allowed the surveillance of emails even in situations where
the company guaranteed its employees privilege and confidentiality.
The Canadian position relating to employee monitoring and surveillance fits in
comfortably somewhere between the UK and the USA. Although this country
have enacted legislation regulating employee monitoring and surveillance, with
a built-in notification requirements. The biggest deficiencies encountered in
these statutes are that they only contain a notification requirement and not a
consent requirement.
The question may be asked which approach is correct? Although from a legal
perspective most academics would insist that the United Kingdom’s approach

36

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 2(2)
is correct, the writer is of the opinion that the current political and social
climate must play a very important role in deciding which approach a country
should take to this subject matter. Moreover, when considering the fact that a
company can incur legal liability for the illegal and inappropriate acts
performed by its employees when making use of the corporate computer
resources and systems, the writer feels that an employer should have the right
to monitor e-mail and Internet usage without too many restraints being placed
on him/her. Therefore, the writer is in favor of the American position
pertaining to this subject matter. Perhaps countries such as the United
Kingdom and Canada should rather ask themselves if they are not empowering
employees too much, because at the end of the day, it is still the employer’s
computer resources and systems that are being used, so why should an
employer not be afforded the right to protect its own assets through monitoring
and surveillance, especially when considering the fact that an employer can be
faced with numerous lawsuit based on the inappropriate use of its computer
assets and resources?
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